Ken Adelman’s ‘Reagan at Reykjavik’ adds to the growing body of literature covering the hastily arranged 1986 U.S. and Soviet Union summit held in Reykjavik, Iceland. No superpower summit since the 1945 Yalta Conference has retained as much interest as Reykjavik, and justifiably so. At Reykjavik, the United States and Soviet Union had on the negotiating table a proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons. This was considered to be the crucial step in developing international relations. With the high potential stakes and the emotional investment of two charismatic leaders, the Reykjavik summit was pivotal in arms control history and high drama. Adelman, who participated in the summit as director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, did well to capture both the geopolitical and human elements of the meeting. And as can be expected from someone who lectured on Shakespeare after leaving government service, Adelman successfully recreates the drama and engages the reader.
In the opening chapters, Adelman outlines the economic and political landscape Reagan and Gorbachev faced in their countries. Adelman provides just enough background information to explain each leader’s motivation. For Ronald Reagan, the backdrop was the United States in the 1980s, marked by a distinctive set of challenges and opportunities. The American economy faced several trials, including stagflation and high unemployment rates. Additionally, the Cold War with the Soviet Union added to intense geopolitical rivalry and the ever-present risk of nuclear conflict. Reagan was committed to conservative economic principles, often referred to as Reaganomics. He believed in limited government intervention in the economy, tax cuts to stimulate growth, and a strong national defense.
On the other side of the globe, Gorbachev was battling an equally intricate set of circumstances. The Soviet Union was contending with a stagnating economy, rampant inefficiency, and technological underdevelopment. The economic situation was compounded by political stagnation within the Communist Party and a sense of disillusionment among the Soviet populace. Adelman elucidates Gorbachev’s motivations by his recognition of the need for urgent reforms. Gorbachev aimed to modernize the Soviet system through initiatives like perestroika (economic restructuring) and glasnost (political openness). He believed in the significance of these reforms not only for the economy’s survival but also for maintaining the Soviet Union’s global influence and preventing an internal upheaval.
Adelman describes Gorbachev as entering the negotiations burdened by the strains of a failing Soviet economy. With a bureaucratic and inefficient centrally controlled economy, Russia had fallen behind in technology and economic development. The repercussions of this economic stagnation were deeply felt on the global stage. The United States had surged ahead, both in terms of technological advancements and economic output, creating a substantial gap between the two superpowers. This disparity was particularly evident in technology, where the U.S. held a distinct advantage. For Gorbachev, addressing these economic challenges was of paramount importance. It was clear to him that the Soviet Union could not sustain its position in the global arena without a radical transformation of its economic and military policies. Gorbachev saw the end of the nuclear arms race as essential for reducing excessive military spending and resurrecting the Soviet economy.
Reagan came to Reykjavik with an entirely different motivation. The U.S. economy had rebounded, and Reagan handily won re-election in 1984 by a large margin. But Reagan, to the dismay of most of his advisors and close allies, believed that nuclear weapons were morally wrong and that the status quo atomic policy of the time, Mutually Assured Destruction, was misguided, unsustainable, and held potentially catastrophic consequences. Reagan saw an agreement to end the arms race and eliminate nuclear weapons as the best way to assure the security of the United States, as long as elimination also included the simultaneous development and deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).
Adelman describes in novelistic detail the three days between the optimistic October 9th arrival and the disappointment-laden Sunday departure of Reagan and his team of advisors. While covering little new substantive historical terrain, Adelman’s detailed descriptions of the moments between the negotiations remind us of the vital and underreported role personal relationships play in geopolitical outcomes. As Reagan and Gorbachev spent more time together at Reykjavik, they developed mutual respect that wasn’t present at their first meeting in Geneva two years earlier. The gradual thawing of ideological hostility and growing personal friendship and trust were the necessary precursors to improve relations between the two superpowers.
Ultimately, Reykjavik failed to achieve an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons. Gorbachev feared the deployment of SDI would give the United States nuclear first-strike capabilities, creating an unacceptable power imbalance. Reagan attempted to assure Gorbachev that the objective of SDI was not to gain a first-strike advantage but to create a missile shield that would make it possible to protect against ‘madmen’ after the superpowers had eliminated their nuclear arsenals. Reagan innately understood the need for common security to build a lasting peace, and he promised Gorbachev he would share the SDI technology with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, after decades of entrenched Cold War thinking, Gorbachev could not accept that the U.S. would commit to sharing SDI.
Even more unfortunate, many of Reagan’s advisors failed to believe in Reagan’s commitment to share SDI. Adelman refers to this idea as ‘rather silly’ and, more cynically, writes that Reagan’s notion ‘proved wily,’ as if Reagan had proposed it as a manipulative tactic rather than an integral part of his solution for eliminating nuclear weapons.
While Reykjavik ended with no immediate new agreements, it did prepare the groundwork for significant new arms control treaties that were signed and ratified in the decade following this summit, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Another less dramatic but currently critical agreement was the Open Skies Treaty, which created greater transparency of the status of deployed military forces of participating countries. And ironically, it involves sharing previously confidential information between the U.S. and Russia. This consensus would have been unheard of before Reykjavik, reinforcing Reagan’s idea of finding common security through cooperation.
Adelman neatly summarizes Reagan at Reykjavik in a final chapter by providing his retrospective views of the lasting impact of this critical forty-eight-hour slice of time. While not everyone will agree with his conclusions, there is little debate that this impromptu summit, held in the cramped and picturesque Höfði house, was a vital pivot point in shaping history.